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Abstract
We study the contribution of the stock of money to the macroeconomic out-
comes of the 1990s in Japan using a small scale structural model. Likelihood-based
estimates of the parameters are provided and time stabilities of the structural rela-
tionships analyzed. Real balances are statistically important for output and inﬂa-
tion ﬂuctuations and their role has changed over time. Models which give money
no role give a distorted representation of the sources of cyclical ﬂuctuations. The
severe stagnation and the long deﬂation are driven by diﬀerent causes.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
The poor macroeconomic performance of Japan in the 1990s has been the subject of an
extensive investigation in the literature. Two reasons contribute to make this episode
unique from the point of view of post-WWII history: the extremely long and severe
output stagnation, comparable only to the one experienced during the 1930s, and the
persistent deﬂation, unprecedented in developed countries. The extraordinary length
of the recession makes the experience an excellent laboratory to study movements
in economic activity in the medium run, their sources and the mechanisms able to
stretch over time temporary exogenous disturbances. The prolonged deﬂation and the
negligible interest rates that accompanied it, on the other hand, brought back on the
front stage of academic research dormant liquidity trap theories (see e.g. Krugman,
1998) and shifted the focus of policymaking activities from monetary to ﬁscal and
other types of stabilization policies.
The literature has provided several explanations for the so-called ”Lost decade”.
They range from the existence of important monetary and ﬁscal policy mistakes (see
Ito and Mishkin, 2004), to depressed investment activities following the asset bubble
of the late 1980s; to a slowdown in total factor productivity coupled with changes
in workweek regulations (see Hayashi and Prescott, 2002 and Esteban Pretel et al.,
2008); to misallocation of resources toward unproductive ﬁrms (see Caballero et al.,
2008). In general, most analyses emphasize problems with the real or the ﬁnancial
intermediation side of the economy and the extremely slow response of policymakers to
economic conditions. Even studies which are monetary in nature (such as Braun and
Waki, 2006, or Eggertsson and Woodford, 2003) give the stock of money no role in, e.g.,
amplifying ﬂuctuations generated by unexpected disturbances. There is an important
reason for this state of aﬀairs. The majority of the monetary models nowadays employed
for business cycle analysis and for optimal policy design share the feature that the stock
of money has a marginal importance in determining the equilibrium of the economy.
Often models make no reference whatsoever to monetary aggregates, and when they do,
they use a speciﬁcation where a money demand function determines how much money
needs to be supplied, given predetermined levels of output, inﬂation, the nominal rate,
etc. Hence, the quantity of money plays no role in amplifying and/or stretching over
time output and inﬂation ﬂuctuations.
Why should money be meaningfully included in the theoretical framework used to
2study medium term ﬂuctuations and to discuss the state of the Japanese economy in
the 1990s? We can think of, at least, three reasons for why omission of money may
induce distortions in the interpretation of the evidence. First, while it is relatively
well known that money has little or no correlation with real variables and inﬂation
at business cycle frequencies, this correlation is considerably larger when longer cycles
are considered. The correlation between per-capita cyclical M2 and per-capita cyclical
output in Japan since 1980 is only 0.10, when cycles of 6 to 24 quarters are considered,
but increases to 0.90, when cycles of 24 to 44 quarters are considered. Second, to
explain a decade long stagnation one cannot rely on a decade long sequence of negative
shocks. Instead, some mechanism amplifying temporary disturbances and transforming
them into medium term ﬂuctuations is needed. The literature has provided suggestions
along these lines (see e.g. the R&D motive of Comin, 2008), but the ability of these
mechanisms to explain the experience appears to be limited. The stock of money could
potentially play such a role if, for example, there are complementarities in production
or in the utility function. Third, the emphasis that the Bank of Japan has given to
monetary aggregates, as instruments to escape the prolonged deﬂa t i o ni nt h el a s tf e w
years, and the even more recent Federal Reserve Bank and European Central Bank
policies of quantitative easing, suggest that, at least in some policymakers’ mind, the
stock of money may matter for both output and inﬂation ﬂuctuations.
This paper examines the role of the stock of money in amplifying ﬂuctuations in
output and inﬂation in Japan over the last 30 years; measures whether and in what
way money has contributed to transform the slowdown of the beginning the 1990s into
the ”Lost decade” and studies which structural disturbance contributes to explain the
path of output and inﬂation in the 1990s. The analysis is conducted using a variant of a
small-scale structural New-Keynesian model. We ﬁrst show what money can do in such
a model, simulating conditional paths for output and inﬂation in speciﬁcations where
money has a role and where it does not. We then estimate the structural parameters
of the model using maximum likelihood (ML) techniques, examine the stability of the
structural relationships and construct historical decompositions to analyze sources of
ﬂuctuations in output and inﬂation. Since the small structural model we employ is
incapable of accounting for all aspects of such a complicated experience, we regard
our work as contributing to the development of a better understanding of the reasons
behind protracted periods of slowdown in economic activity rather than testing one
or more causes of the ”Lost decade”. Nevertheless, our structural analysis allow us to
3comment on certain explanations put forward in the literature.
For the sake of presentation, we organize the discussion of our ﬁndings around four
broad questions. First, does money have a role in explaining ﬂuctuations in output and
inﬂation in Japan since 1980? Second, is there a change in the importance of money
over interesting subsamples? Third, does the model account for the ”Lost decade” via
changes in the structural parameters or via changes in the distribution of the shocks?
Fourth, what disturbances could be jointly responsible for the output stagnation and
the deﬂation observed in the 1990s? Our results are as follows.
First, money is statistically and economically important in characterizing cyclical
ﬂuctuations in output and inﬂation in Japan. Money matters both directly, through
its eﬀects on the Euler equation and the Phillips curve, and indirectly, through the
Central Bank determination of the nominal interest rate. Money plays a role because
it alters both the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure and
the intertemporal rate of substitution of consumption at diﬀerent points in time and
because, when reacting to nominal balances, the monetary authority indirectly reacts
to inﬂation. These channels help to amplify the magnitude of cyclical ﬂuctuations
that the model can account for and make their persistence stronger. The evidence
we collect suggests that neglecting money may create important statistical biases and
relevant inferential mistakes when interpreting the 1990s in Japan.
Second, the role of money has changed over time and our estimates indicate that
it may have mattered most in the 1990s. Interestingly, it played little role over the
last ten years. While this outcome may be taken as a sign of misspeciﬁcation - in
the 1990s money may be proxying for a mechanism which is missing from the model
- we have found no evidence that money stands in for credit, asset prices or standard
omitted suspects. Thus, the slow expansion of the quantity of money in circulation
may have contributed to transform the downturn of the beginning of the 1990s into a
severe output stagnation and a moderate inﬂation into a deﬂation.
Third, our model accounts for Japan’s ”Lost decade” through changes in the eco-
nomic parameters regulating the private sector behavior and the monetary policy rule
and in the auxiliary parameters regulating the persistence and the volatility of the
exogenous disturbances. This is consistent with what the literature on the Great Mod-
eration in the US has found, using similar models (see e.g. Canova, 2009). However,
changes in the distribution of the shocks appear to be a much more important mecha-
nism to account for the experience than changes in the economic parameters.
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ent causes. Shocks that aﬀect the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution in the
economy are crucial to explain the path of output in the 1990s. Shocks that alter the
marginal cost of production, on the other hand, primarily drive inﬂation movements
during the decade. Interestingly, technology shocks have little to do with the output
stagnation of the 1990s. Since it is well known that Solow residuals are poor proxies
for technological variations, the idea that TFP changes are responsible for the ”Lost
decade” should be probably reconsidered. Finally, monetary policy is in part to blame
for the poor macroeconomic outcomes. Monetary policy has been very restrictive, at
least up to 2003, and this has contributed to keep both the recession and the deﬂation
going for a number of additional years. The situation appears to have changed since
2003 but only marginally.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the theo-
retical model used to organize the data and shows what money can do to output and
inﬂation ﬂuctuations. Section 3 describes the data and its sources. Section 4 presents
the results for the full sample and for selected subsamples, and examines how the model
deals with the ”Lost decade”. Section 5 studies what drives the path of output and
inﬂation in the 1990s. Section 6 concludes.
2 The theoretical framework
Our model builds on the basic New-Keynesian model without capital accumulation
described in Gali (2008). We extend this simple structure in three ways. First, we allow
for habit in consumption. Second, we allow but do not require the stock of money to
play a role in the determination of output and inﬂation, by making real balances enter
non-additively in the utility of the representative agent. Third, we permit the growth
rate of nominal balances to enter the Central Bank rule. Apart from giving money
an indirect role in the model, the speciﬁcation we choose allows us to deal with the
problem of appropriately specifying a policy rule when the nominal rate hits the zero
bound (see section 4.5 for a discussion). We have also considered the possibility that
the growth rate of the exchange rate also enter the policy rule. In this case, we treated
Japan as a small open economy and the exchange rate was determined, in equilibrium,
by an interest parity condition. We present results only for the closed economy version
of the model because the exchange rate seems to play no role in the analysis and the
5international (ﬁnancial) feedbacks seems relatively small.
2.1 The model
Since the economy is quite standard, we only brieﬂy describe its features. There is a
representative household, a representative ﬁnal good producing ﬁrm, a continuum of
intermediate goods ﬁrms each producing a diﬀerentiated good i ∈ [0,1] and a monetary















where xt = ct − hct−1, 0 <β<1, h,η > 0 subject to the sequence of constraints




where ct is consumption, nt are hours worked, pt is the price level, Mt are nominal
balances, Wt is the nominal wage, Bt are one period nominal bonds with gross nominal
interest rate Rt, Tt are lump sum nominal transfers at the beginning of each t and
Dt are dividends distributed by the intermediate ﬁrms. at and et are disturbances to
preferences and to the money demand, whose properties will be described below. Let
mt ≡ Mt
pt denote real balances and πt ≡
pt
pt−1 the gross inﬂation rate during period t.
The representative ﬁnal good producing ﬁrm uses yi
t units of intermediate good i,
purchased at the price pi
t to manufacture yt units of the ﬁnal good according to the
constant returns to scale technology yt =[
R 1
0 (yi
t)(θ−1)/θdi]θ/(1−θ) with θ>1.P r o ﬁt









so that θ measures the constant price elasticity of demand for each intermediate good.




An intermediate goods producing ﬁrm i hires ni
t units of labor to produce yi
t units
of intermediate good using the production function yi
t = ztni
t, where zt is an aggregate
productivity shock. Since intermediate goods substitute imperfectly for one another
in producing ﬁnished goods, the intermediate ﬁrms act as monopolistic competitors
in their pricing decisions. We assume that, when ﬁrms change prices, they face the











6where φ>0 and πs measures steady state inﬂation. The problem faced by the repre-

















subject to (3), where βtatU1(xt, Mt
ptet) measures the marginal utility value to the house-






























The monetary authority is characterized by a set of rules where the policy instru-
ment, which could be either the nominal rate or the growth rate of money, responds to










t  t (7)
and  t is a monetary policy shock.
There are four disturbances in the model vt =( at,e t,z t,  t) a n dt h e ya r ec h a r a c -
terized by logvt =¯ v + N logvt−1 + ut,w h e r eN is a diagonal matrix with entries
(ρa,ρ e,ρ z,0), respectively. The covariance matrix Σ of the structural shocks ut is diag-




 . In a symmetric equilibrium all the ﬁrms make identical
choices so yi
t = yt, ni
t = nt, pi
t = pt,a n dDi
t = Dt.
















[(ˆ mt − ˆ et) − (Et ˆ mt+1 − Etˆ et+1)] (8)
ˆ mt = γ1(ˆ yt − hˆ yt−1) − γ2 ˆ Rt +( 1− (Rs − 1)γ2)ˆ et (9)
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0=− ˆ Rt + ρr ˆ Rt−1 +( 1− ρr)ρyˆ yt−p +( 1− ρr)ρπˆ πt−p
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The superscript s denotes steady state values of the variables, Uj is the ﬁrst derivative
of U with respect to argument j =1 ,2 and Uij is the second order derivative of the
utility function, i,j =1 ,2.
The log-linearized Euler condition (equation (8)) and the forward looking Phillips
curve (equation (10) include, in addition to standard arguments, terms involving real
money balances and the money demand shocks. These terms are irrelevant for (cyclical)
output and inﬂation determination if and only if the utility function is separable in con-
sumption and real balances, i.e. U12 =0(see equation (13)). Intuitively, real balances
matter in the Euler condition because they aﬀect the marginal rate of substitution
between consumption and leisure. Thus, they inﬂuence not only the aggregate demand
but also the aggregate supply, via intertemporal consumption-saving decisions. Since,
in equilibrium, the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure is
equal to the real wage, real balances matter in the Phillips curve because the real wage
is a crucial component of the marginal costs and directly aﬀects the aggregate supply
curve. Interestingly, the model implies that whenever real balances enter the Euler
equation and Phillips curve, the money demand shock enters too - these cross equation
restrictions help with the identiﬁcation of the parameters.
In this paper, we are interested primarily in the estimates of ω2 and of ρm. ω2
measures the direct role of money in determining the magnitude and the persistence
of output and inﬂation ﬂuctuations; ρm, on the other hand, measures the long run
indirect eﬀects that money has on these two variables, through the actions of the
monetary authority. When ω2 is zero, utility is separable and real balances have no
direct role in propagating monetary business cycles. When both ω2 and ρm are zero,
money could be totally omitted from the analysis without statistical or interpretation
losses. Our a-priori expectation is that both ω2 and ρm are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from
zero but vary over time. Our empirical analysis intends to shed light on this conjecture.
82.2 The quantitative role of money
The previous subsection has indicated how money aﬀects the equilibrium level of output
and inﬂation. This qualitative analysis provides useful intuition but is insuﬃcient to
justify the use of monetary models where money has a role. In particular, it gives no
evidence on how important money is in amplifying real and nominal ﬂuctuations and it
is silent about the quantitative size of the eﬀects. Thus, before estimating the model,
we want to explore what diﬀerence the presence of money may make for output and
inﬂation ﬂuctuations and along which dimensions we should expect giving money a role
may help us to understand better the nature of real world ﬂuctuations.
We plot in ﬁgure 1 the responses of output and inﬂation to unitary impulses in the
four disturbances in three diﬀerent situations: when both ω2 and ρm are diﬀerent from
zero, when ω2 is diﬀerent from zero but ρm is zero and when both parameters are zero.
We set β = .99,ψ =0 .1,ω1 =2 .0,γ2 =0 .72,σa =0 .31,σz =0 .059,σe =0 .009,σ  =
0.007 h =0 .8,ρ r =0 .7,ρ y =0 .2,ρ π =1 .52, and ρa =0 .40,ρ z =0 .70,ρ e =0 .80,
which are close to the values calibrated or estimated by Ireland (2004), and let ω2 to
be either 2.0 or 0.0 and ρm be either 1.0 or 0.0. These values are arbitrary, but ω2 =2
implies relatively small complementarities between real balances and consumption in
the utility function and ρm =1implies a 30 basis point change in the nominal rate for
a one percent deviation of real money growth from its steady state path. Both values
are in the ball-park set of estimates we provide below.
The ﬁgure indicates that money is important to propagate certain type of shocks
to output. In particular, when the stock of money plays a role, the response of output
to technology and to money demand shocks is stronger and longer lived. For inﬂation,
diﬀerences are smaller, but even in this case, the responses are larger when money has
a role. Notice that the direct and the indirect channels reinforce each other so that, for
example, the sum of the individual eﬀects is typically smaller than the combined eﬀect
obtained when both ρm 6=0and ω2 6=0 .
The unconditional variabilities and the persistence of output and inﬂation are also
aﬀected by the presence of money. For example, in the model with both channels
operating, the (average across 100 simulations) variabilities of output and inﬂation are
0.0014 and 0.0002, respectively. These variabilities drop to 0.0011 and 0.00017 when
only the direct channel is present, and to 0.00009 and 0.00013, when money plays no
role. Similarly, the persistence of output and inﬂation ﬂuctuations drops from 0.8 and
90.75 to 0.68 and 0.57, when both channels are shut down. We do not want to attach too
much emphasis to these numbers since the calibration we have used is purely illustrative.
Nevertheless, it is clear that, both conditionally and unconditionally, money may make
an important quantitative diﬀerence in interpreting real world evidence.
3 The data and the estimation approach
We assume that the investigator observes data for output, the inﬂation rate, the nominal
rate and real balances. The sample used to estimate the structural parameters goes
from 1980:1 to 2007:4. The data is obtained from IMF and OECD data bases. The
inﬂation rate is measured by the growth rate of the GDP deﬂator; the nominal rate
by the call rate; for money we use M2 plus certiﬁcate of deposits. GDP and monetary
aggregates are scaled by the GDP deﬂator and by civilian population in the 16-65 group
to transform them in real per-capita terms. The raw data (in logs for scaled GDP and
M2) is plotted in ﬁgure 2.
One could argue that, since M2 includes interest bearing assets, it is not the most
appropriate monetary aggregate to use in the model. We have two responses to this
point. First, M2 is the standard aggregate that the business cycle literature has used
and this facilitates the comparison of interesting correlation statistics. Second, while
smaller monetary aggregates are highly unstable, M2 does not show any evidence of
instability. A discussion of the results obtained with an alternative the monetary ag-
gregate is in section 4.5
Per-capita real GDP and real money balances display an upward trend. Since the
drift appears to be almost deterministic and idiosyncratic across variables, we separately
eliminate it from the log of the two series using a linear speciﬁcation. The inverted
pattern that interest rates and inﬂation display are much more diﬃcult to deal with.
Consistent with the literature, we demean both series.
One alternative to the strategy we use to match the data to the model’s counter-
parts is to allow the technology shock zt to be non-stationary and remove the upward
trend in per-capita real output and per-capita real balances using a model consistent
methodology. We do not follow this approach for two reasons. First, when technology
shocks have a unit root, per-capita output and real balances share the same trend,
which is not the case here. Second, it is unclear whether all non-cyclical ﬂuctuations
can be safely attributed to non-stationary technology shocks. Chang et al. (2006) have
10recently ﬁt a model with non-stationary preference shocks to US data with good results.
The model (8)-(11) contains 19 parameters; 5 structural ones η1 =( h,ρr,ρ y,ρ π,ρ m),
3 semi-structural ones η2 =( ψ,ω2,γ2) and 7 auxiliary ones, η3 =( ρa,ρ z,ρ e,σa,σz,σe,
σ ) plus the discount factor β, the utility parameter ω1, and the steady state values of
the nominal interest rate and the output to real balance ratio, η4 =( β,Rs,ω1
ys
ms). Our
exercise is geared to obtain likelihood-based estimates of η =( η1,η2,η3), conditional on
selected values for η4.W er e a dRs oﬀ the average level of inﬂation, once we set β =0 .99.
The value of ω1 is set to 2 and m
y ratio is ﬁxed to 1.5, following Chari et. al. (2002).
Changing this ratio from 1.5 to 2.5 has minor consequences on the estimates we obtain.
We do not estimate η4 jointly with the other parameters because the likelihood has
little information for these parameters - since the variables are detrended (demeaned),
one should expect this to happen.
The model can be solved using standard methods. Its solution has the format:
x1t+1 = A1(η)x1t + A2(η)ut (17)
x2t = A3(η)x1t + A4(η)ut (18)
where x2t =[ ˆ yt, ˆ πt, ˆ Rt, ˆ mt], x1t =[ ˆ yt−1, ˆ πt−1, ˆ Rt−1, ˆ mt−1,∆ ˆ Mt−1, ˆ v1t,ˆ v2t, ˆ v3t, ˆ v4t] and
the matrices Ai(η),i=1 ,2 are complicated nonlinear functions of the parameters η.
Likelihood-based estimation of the parameters entering (17) and (18) is simple:
given some η, and a sample [t1,...,t 2], we compute the likelihood, denoted by f(y[t1,...,t2]|η),
by means of the Kalman ﬁlter and the prediction error decomposition and update the
original η values using gradient methods. The Kalman ﬁlter is easy to use since the so-
lution comes in the form a linear state space system where (17) is a transition equation
and (18) an observation equation.
The likelihood function of the model is diﬃcult to maximize since it displays multiple
peaks and large ﬂat areas. It is well known that Bayesian methods have an edge over
classical methods when the likelihood function is poorly behaved. However, the choice
of priors is problematic here since it may make the posterior of the parameters look
very diﬀerent from the likelihood. In this situation inference may crucially depend on
the shape, the location and the spread of the multivariate prior density. Our choice of
letting the data freely speak is complemented with an ex-post criteria, which eliminates
economically implausible estimates or estimates violating stability or non-negativity
constraints.
114 The results
4.1 Full sample evidence
We start by analyzing the estimates we obtain for the full sample, which we report
in the ﬁrst column of table 1. In parenthesis are standard errors, computed from the
Hessian of the function at the maximum.
Estimation appears to be suﬃciently successful and all the economic parameters
are signiﬁcant. Habit in consumption turns out to be strong, as is the inertia in the
nominal rate. The response of the nominal interest rate to output is weak and the semi-
elasticity of money demand similar to the one estimated in the US for this period. The
money demand shock is highly persistent; the preference and the technology shocks die
out suﬃciently fast. We plot the (reduced form) residuals of the output and inﬂation
equations in Figure 3, as an additional check on the success of the estimation exercise.
The model captures the decline in output and inﬂation occurred in the 1990s, but falls
short of fully explaining the pattern. In fact, the residuals of both variables display a
small declining trend from 1990 up to 1995. Thus, the model needs to be augmented
with additional features to be able to completely account for the experience.
Turning to the estimates of the parameters of interest, the direct eﬀect of money
ω2 is 1.74 and this value is statistically signiﬁcant and the (long run) indirect eﬀect of
money ρm is 1.50 and it is again statistically signiﬁcant. We formally test for the joint
signiﬁcance of the direct and indirect eﬀects of money using an asymptotic likelihood
ratio test and a small sample version of the same test, where a correction for the number
of estimated parameters is used. The null hypothesis in both cases is that money does
not matter, i.e. ω2 = ρm =0 . All other parameters are left unrestricted under the
null and the alternative. The diﬀerence in the log-likelihood of the two speciﬁcations
is large (1451 vs. 1436) and the null hypothesis is soundly rejected with both tests.
It is comforting to ﬁnd that the eﬀects of money are statistically signiﬁcant and that
t h ep r e s e n c eo fm o n e yi m p r o v e st h eﬁt of the model. Still, what matters most is whether
money plays an important economic role, where by this we mean that the absence of
money would induce researchers to draw wrong conclusions about the drivers of output
and inﬂation ﬂuctuations. To study this question, ﬁgure 4 plots the responses of output
and inﬂation to the four disturbances, when the model is estimated with and without
money. In a model where money matters, the responses of both output and inﬂation to
technology and money demand shocks are considerably ampliﬁed and the magnitude
12and the persistence of the responses to preference and, to some extent, monetary policy
shocks are signiﬁcantly toned down. Hence, models where money dichotomizes with
the rest of the variables provide a distorted view of the sources of ﬂuctuations in the
economy. For example, technology shocks explain the largest portion of the forecast
error variance of inﬂation at the 4-5 year horizon in the benchmark model (48 percent),
but such a proportion dramatically falls when ω2 and ρm are zero (26 percent) and
preference shocks become the dominant source of variations.
In sum, the model appears to do a reasonably good job in characterizing the
Japanese economy over the last 30 years. The structural evidence we have collected sug-
gests that money statistically matters in shaping monetary business cycles in Japan.
Excluding money from the model aﬀects the statistical ﬁt and may change the eco-
nomic interpretation of the evidence. Since the persistence and the variability of the
responses of output and inﬂation to exogenous disturbances depend on the postulated
role of money, it is possible to attribute certain patterns to the wrong sources, when
using a standard speciﬁcation with no feedback from money to output, inﬂation or the
nominal rate.
4.2 Subsample evidence
The analysis in the previous subsection was conducted assuming that no structural
changes took place. It is not hard to question such an assumption: there is plenty of
evidence that structural changes did occur in Japan over this period. For example, the
length of the workweek was reduced at the beginning of the 1990s; the legal status of
the Bank of Japan changed at the end of 1997; and the (steady state) level of saving
dropped considerably in the 1990s from the level prevailing in the 1980s. To see whether
our conclusions concerning the role of money are due to inappropriate handling of these
time varying patterns, we repeat structural estimation over several subsamples. The
main problem we face in conducting subsample estimation is that a break date is hard
to select. The multiplicity of events we mention indicates that it may be diﬃcult to
decide a-priori when the new regime started and speciﬁcation errors may matter.
Rather than arbitrarily choosing a break date, we proceed as in the literature that
tests for (unknown) structural breaks and conduct estimation over many subsamples.
That is, we start estimating the model over the subsamples 1980-1990 and 1991-2007,
then repeated estimation 9 times, augmenting the end date of the ﬁrst subsample
by a year, and concluded estimating the model over the subsamples 1980-1998 and
131999-2007. We then compute the log-likelihood for each break date (summing the log-
likelihoods for each of the two subsamples) and select as break date the point giving
the highest log-likelihood. It turns out that the two most likely break dates are 1991
and 1997 and that the diﬀerence in the log-likelihood is small (1539 vs. 1537). Since
both dates seem to be important, we present structural estimates breaking the full
sample at 1991 and 1997 (see table 1, columns 2 to 5). Incidentally, the log likelihood
obtained breaking the sample in two is always larger than the log likelihood for the
full sample. Therefore, there is a strong statistical evidence that the structure of the
Japanese economy changed signiﬁcantly over the 1990s.
Estimates of the structural parameters tend to change over subsamples. For exam-
ple, the output coeﬃcient in the Taylor rule is much larger in the 1980-1991 sample
or in 1998-2007 sample than in the full sample. Similarly, the semi-elasticity of money
demand to interest rates is much larger in the 1980-1991 and 1998-2007 samples than
in the full sample. The coeﬃcient on inﬂation in the Taylor rule (which is here the
sum of ρp and ρm) ﬂuctuates somewhat depending on the sample and in the 1992-2007
is very close to the lower bound of admissible values we have chosen to insure that
no indeterminate solutions occur. Interestingly, while the persistence of technology
shocks is large in both the 1980-1991 and the 1980-1997 samples, it becomes negligi-
ble in the 1992-2007 and 1998-2007 subsamples. Finally, there are important changes
in the relative variability of the shocks over time: technology shocks dominate in the
1980s, preference shocks have the largest volatility in the 1990s and, in the 2000s, the
variability of technology shock is once again the largest. Because of the small size
of subsamples, standard errors are typically large and most of the estimates of the
economic parameters turn out to be insigniﬁcant.
Turning to the parameters of interest, we ﬁnd that estimates of ω2 and ρm vary
over subsamples. In particular, the importance of the indirect eﬀect of money ρm
steadily declines - the point estimate we obtain in the second subsamples is about half
of the point estimate obtained in the ﬁrst subsamples, no matter what break date we
consider. This pattern appears to be consistent with the conventional wisdom that
money was an important determinant of monetary policy decisions in the 1980s and
that its importance declined considerably since then. Also interestingly, from our point
o fv i e wi st h ef a c tt h a tt h ed i r e c te ﬀect of money is small in the 1980s, becomes more
important in the 1990s and disappears in the 2000s. Thus, having money in the model
seems to be important when explaining the mechanisms that led to the ”Lost decade”
14but probably not so crucial to account for the 2000s. This conclusion is consistent with
the reduced form evidence of Miyao (2005), who ﬁnd that the link between monetary
aggregates, output and prices disappears in the late-1990s.
We plot the responses of output and inﬂation to the four shocks in the full sample
and in the subsamples 1980-1991, 1992-2007 and 1998-2007 in ﬁgure 5. At naked eye,
one can notice signiﬁcant changes in the transmission of disturbances over time. For
example, output responses to monetary policy and technology shocks are stronger and
less persistent in the last sample - here the half life of the responses to both shocks
is about half of the size as with the other two subsamples - and output responses to
money demand shocks are also much stronger in the last sample. One should be careful
in interpreting this evidence as indicating that monetary policy shocks have become
more powerful in the last part of the sample, because the variance of the shocks may
have changed. In fact, as we see from table 1, the variance of the shocks driving the
monetary policy rule fall considerably in the last 10 years. Hence, the ﬁvefold increase
in the impact eﬀect of monetary shocks on output is more than compensated by the
9 fold decline in the variance of the shocks, making monetary policy, if anything, less
eﬀective in the 1998-2007 period (see e.g. Miyao (2000) and Inoue and Okimoto (2008)
for VAR evidence on this issue).
Variations over time in the responses of inﬂation are generally much smaller. How-
ever, one can notice a more persistent response to preference shocks in the last 10 years
and a progressively weaker but more persistent response to monetary policy shocks, as
we move from the 1980s to the latter part of the sample. Hence, while the impact eﬀect
of monetary policy on inﬂation has consistently declined, it appears that (bad) shocks
can aﬀect it for a longer period.
Two other interesting features of output responses should be mentioned. First, the
responses of output to the disturbances in the 1980-1991 and 1992-2007 samples are
similar. Therefore, even though, statistically, the 1991 break is the strongest, there
are limited economic diﬀerences in the two selected subsamples - an indication that it
is the distribution of the shocks which has changed at this date. Second, full sample
responses tend to be stronger and more persistent than subsamples responses. Thus
aggregation biases may be important, making the practice of interpreting the 1990s
with full sample estimates not very credible.
Finally, one can easily see from ﬁgure 5 that technology shocks are the most impor-
tant driver of the forecast error variance of inﬂation in every subsample at medium-long
15term horizons. Preference shocks, and to a much smaller extent technology shocks, are
instead the main determinants of the forecast error variance of output in all subsamples.
Hence, the output stagnation of the 1990s is not necessarily connected with the long
deﬂation and to account for the two phenomena at least two sources of disturbances
are needed. We will come back on this issue in the next section.
4.3 How does the model account for the lost decade?
We have seen that the simple model we employ is, to a large extent, capable of repli-
cating the decline of output and the deﬂation experienced by the Japanese economy
during the 1990s. The question we want to investigate here is how does the model
capture these changes. In particular, we are interested in knowing which set of para-
meters is altered and whether most of the variations occur in the economic parameters
or in the auxiliary parameters describing the time series process for the disturbances.
Apart from shedding light on the mechanics of the ”Lost decade”, as seen through the
lenses of our model, such an investigation may provide further evidence on whether
the changes experienced in industrialized economies over the last 30 years are due to
variations of the structure or to changes in the type and intensity of the disturbances.
It turns out that, on the private sector side of the economy, ω2 and γ2 are the
parameters which vary most across subsamples. The monetary policy rule seems also
to have changed signiﬁcantly: interest rate inertia is stronger and both the inﬂation
and the output parameters are aﬀected. However, the largest changes appear to occur
in the parameters describing the stochastic process for the exogenous disturbances. For
example, the persistence and the variability of the preference shock vary considerably
over time and the variability of the technology shocks also changes across subsamples.
This conclusion is roughly independent of which of the two break dates one considers.
Thus, the model tells us that both the structure of the economy and the nature of
the shocks have changed, a ﬁnding which is consistent with the most recent structural
literature on the Great Moderation in the US (see e.g. Canova, 2009). To examine
which variation matters most we conduct two counterfactuals where we ﬁxo n es e to f
parameters (either the economic or the auxiliary ones) at the level prevailing in the
ﬁrst subsample and let the other set be freely estimated in the second subsample. We
then compare the likelihood obtained when all the parameters are left unrestricted with
those obtained in the two restricted speciﬁcations. Restricting either set of parameters
to be unchanged signiﬁcantly aﬀects the log likelihood - the drop is by more than 60
16points, regardless of the chosen break date. However, when we restrict the distribution
of the shocks to be time invariant, the drop is larger by about 30 points. Hence, changes
in the distribution of the shocks are more important to account for the Lost Decade.
4.4 Discussion
A few important lessons can be drawn from our analysis. First, the stock of money is
statistically important in characterizing cyclical ﬂuctuations in output and inﬂation in
Japan and both the direct and the indirect eﬀects of money are crucial to understand
how cyclical ﬂuctuations are propagated. As far as we know, the typical policy rules
that are nowadays estimated in the literature do not include the growth rate of nominal
balance among the regressors. Since reacting to nominal balances is also a way to
indirectly react to inﬂation, it is likely that, in typical rules, the inﬂation coeﬃcient
is overestimated, the richness of second round dynamics due to money muﬄed, and
policy conclusions distorted.
Second, the role of money has changed over time and our estimates indicate that
money may have mattered most in the 1990s. While this outcome may indicate mis-
speciﬁcation - money may be proxying in the 1990s for mechanisms which are missing
from the model - we have found no evidence that money stands in for standard omit-
ted suspects (asset prices, oil, etc.). For example, repeating estimation allowing for
oil in the production function does not change any of the conclusions. Interestingly,
while structural estimates change across samples, the transmission of shocks to inﬂation
hardly changes over time. On the other hand, the transmission mechanism of distur-
bances to output shows some variations, but only since 1998. Hence, the changes that
the Japanese economy experienced started producing interesting economic eﬀects only
in the last 10 years and these changes make the real side of the economy temporarily
more reactive to shocks.
Third, the ”Lost decade” is a complex experience and our model accounts for it
with changes in the parameters regulating the private sector behavior, changes in the
parameters of the monetary policy rule, changes in the distribution from which distur-
bances are drawn and residual unexplained variations. While all contribute, changes in
shock distribution are the most important ones. This conclusion is in part due to the
simplicity of the model which does not allow, for example, for an intercept in the Tay-
lor rule (as in Braun and Waki, 2006) or to distinguish between changes in eﬃciency
vs. changes in the technological progress (such as Nemoto and Goto, 2005). Had a
17more elaborate structure been considered, the relative importance of various sources of
variations could have been altered.
4.5 Robustness
In this subsection we discuss the results of two sensitivity exercises: one designed to
investigate how misleading is our speciﬁcation for monetary policy when the interest
rate reached the zero lower bound; and another to study the eﬀects of changing the
monetary aggregates on estimates of the parameters of interest.
When the interest rate reaches the zero bound, it may be diﬃcult to claim that a
standard Taylor rule describes well the monetary policy process. Therefore, one may
consider adding a zero lower bound constraint to the model, as in e.g. Braun and Waki
(2006). However, maximum likelihood estimation of a model where the zero bound
may be occasionally binding is unfeasible because the decision rules of the model imply
that the likelihood function can no longer be computed with the Kalman ﬁlter.
However, our speciﬁcation is suﬃciently ﬂexible that can endogenously adapt to sit-
uations where the zero lower bound is hit without any need to take the bound explicitly
into account. To see this consider the point estimates obtained in the subsample 1998-
2007. From table 1 one can see that the estimated rule can be approximately written
as Rt =0 .5yt +0 .4πt + ∆mt + ut where ut is a process with long memory. Since Rt is
roughly zero over the sample, the rule can be alternatively written as an implicit money
growth rule: ∆mt = −0.5yt − 0.4πt − ut. Hence, with the estimated parameters, the
rule tells us that money growth increases when the gap is negative and when inﬂation
goes into negative territory - something very much akin to quantitative easing. Inter-
estingly, and conﬁrming the conventional wisdom, the estimated coeﬃcients imply that
the reaction of money growth to economic growth is weak - an indication that over the
last 10 years a policy of quantitative easing fell shy of the need of the economy.
To restate the point in a somewhat diﬀerent way, when the zero bound on interest
rate is reached, our policy rule can be transformed into a money growth rule without any
need to change the speciﬁcation or to directly specify a lower bound on the interest rate.
The data endogenously selects the most appropriate normalization for each sample.
As we argued, our main reason for using an aggregate like M2 plus certiﬁcate of
deposits is that this series, once it is normalized by the price level and by population,
i sm u c hm o r es t a b l ea n dw i t hm u c hm o r er e a sonable properties than other smaller
monetary aggregates. For example, while per-capita real M2 balances and real M1
18balances have a similar trends (long run correlation 0.93), their cyclical components
are substantially diﬀerent. In fact, their contemporaneous correlation is negative (-
0.45). Moreover, the contemporaneous correlation of the cyclical component of per-
capita real M2 balances and output is about 0.7, while the contemporaneous correlation
of the cyclical component of per-capita real M1 balances and output is -0.77. The
counterintuitive sign for this latter correlation is roughly maintained if we split the
sample in two, even though the magnitude of the correlation changes considerably
(from -0.85 for the sample up to 1991 to -0.31 afterward). However, since it is not clear
which monetary aggregate belongs to the utility function of our representative agent, we
repeated estimation over the subsamples 1980-1997 and 1997-2008 using real per-capita
M1 balances. The results are in the last two columns of table 1 and do not appear to be
very reasonable. For example, both ω2 and ρm are negative in both samples, although
only the former is signiﬁcant; the coeﬃcient on inﬂation in the Taylor rule is higher
in the second subsample and estimates ψ, which are related to price stickiness of the
economy, increase dramatically in the second subsample. In addition, the ﬁto ft h e
model appear to be unsatisfactory - the residuals of the output and inﬂation equations
are serially correlated and display a slight downward trend - reinforcing the conclusion
that M2 should be used in our structural estimation exercises.
5 What drives the path of output and inﬂa t i o ni nt h e
1990s?
The depressing performance of Japan in recent years has provided the stimulus for
extensive academic research (see, among others, the symposium issues of the Japanese
Economic Review, 2006, and the Journal of Japanese and International Economics,
2005). The literature appears to dived into two main camps; roughly, one camp em-
phasizes failures in the supply side; the other attributes the slump to weak demand
conditions. Since the performance of our structural model is, by statistical standards,
reasonable, we can contribute to the debate by analyzing the contribution of each the
four disturbances to the path of output and inﬂation that materialized over the 1990s.
While a decomposition in demand vs. supply driven eﬀects is not possible, since the
general equilibrium nature of the model implies that disturbances typically have ef-
fects on both the aggregate supply and the aggregate demand curve of the economy,
such an analysis is nevertheless useful to highlight sources of output stagnation and of
19the deﬂation and to provide new insights about the relative validity of the suggested
explanations. In ﬁgures 6 and 7 we present the results of an historical decomposition
exercise where we plot the path of output and inﬂation which is unpredictable based on
the information available at 1991:4 or 1997:4 (dashed line) and the counterfactual path
of the same two variables that would have materialized if only one disturbance were
present in the economy. In other words, we plot what output and inﬂation would have
been, once the path which is predictable based on the information available at 1991:4
and 1997:4 has been removed, had there be only one type of shock in the period. For
readability, we present the paths due to the preference shocks (a-shock), the monetary
shock (r-shock) and the technology shock (z-shock) since the contribution of money
demand shocks is everywhere negligible.
Figure 6 indicates that the model interprets the downward trend in the unexpected
output in the 1990s as primarily due to preference shocks. Monetary policy also con-
tributes to this downward trend, but only since 1997. Interestingly, the counterfactual
output path induced by the technological disturbances does not line up well with the
idea that technology shocks are responsible for the ”Lost decade”: output would have
been counterintuitively increasing up to the mid-1990s and would have been falling
while remaining on the positive territory after that date. Note also that preference
shocks are responsible not only for the downward trend but also for most of the short
term movements in the unexpected output. Monetary policy and technology shocks
instead have no role in explaining unpredictable short term output movements. Tech-
nology shocks account for both the downward trend in the path and for the short terms
ups and downs in the inﬂation series (in agreement with the ﬁndings of Shimpo (2005)).
Preference and monetary disturbances, instead, have little to do both with the path
and the ﬂuctuations of the unpredictable component of inﬂation throughout the 1990s.
Figure 6 sheds some important light on the role of monetary policy in the expe-
rience. The Bank of Japan has been often criticized for being behind the cycle and
for not having done enough to stimulate the economy. Our structural analysis indi-
cates that monetary policy was expansionary up to the middle of the 1990: both the
counterfactual path of unexpected output and inﬂation would have been positive and
substantially so until 1997. Monetary policy turned contractionary since 1998 and both
the counterfactual path of output and inﬂation display a U-shaped pattern since then,
with the through located in 2003 - here, the unexpected path of both variables becomes
negative. Since 2003, monetary policy has been marginally less restrictive and, by the
20end of the sample, the counterfactual unexpected path of output and inﬂation due to
monetary disturbances is roughly zero. Interestingly, this latest period of less restric-
tive monetary policy coincides with the period of quantitative easing adopted by the
Bank of Japan (see e.g. Ito and Mishkin, 2004).
The results we obtain looking at the last ten years of data, but using estimates
obtained up to 1997 (see ﬁgure 7) are consistent with what we have found in ﬁgure
6. The medium term trends in the unexpected output path since 1998 are due to
monetary shocks and technology shocks play no role in driving short or medium run
ﬂuctuations. The short term movements in the unpredictable component of inﬂation
are instead mainly driven by technology shocks while preference shocks contribute to
keep the level of unexpected inﬂation gravitates in the negative territory.
Three important conclusions can be derived from this analysis. First, the (real) re-
cession and the (nominal) deﬂation of the 1990s are driven by diﬀerent causes. Shocks
that aﬀect the (average) intertemporal marginal rate of substitution in the economy,
are crucial to explain the path of unexpected output in the 1990s. While the model is
too stylized to say more about what these shocks are, one can associate these distur-
bances with shocks that have changed the average saving rate of the economy and/or
have aﬀected the labor supply of the agents. Unexpected inﬂation movements, instead,
appear to be driven by disturbances aﬀecting the aggregate marginal costs of produc-
tion. Again, since the model is stark, not much can be said about the nature of these
disturbances. However, one can guess that they could proxy for ﬁscal policy shocks,
labor supply shocks as well as shocks to the acquisition of goods used in production.
Second, technology shocks have little to do with the long stagnation of the 1990s.
It is well known, at least since Evans (1992), that Solow residuals are poor proxies
for technological variations and the results we obtain are consistent with this view:
Solow residuals, for example, may proxy for the eﬀects captured here by preference
disturbances. It is hard to formally compare the Solow residuals produced, e.g., by
Hayashi and Prescott (2002) with our technology shocks for a number of reasons. First,
their accounting exercises use annual data while our estimates are quarterly. Second,
our model has no capital accumulation, while their exercises use data on investment
to construct a measure of Solow residuals. Third, they use data only up to the 1990s
while our estimates incorporate information up to 2007. Finally, the estimates of φ we
obtain imply, for any reasonable value of the elasticity of substitution between varieties
θ, that price stickiness is an important feature of the data. Therefore, the fact that
21Solow residuals are obtained in a frictionless economy while our estimates of technology
shocks result from an economy where pricing frictions are important makes a formal
comparison of the two measures diﬃcult.
Third, monetary policy is responsible for the poor macroeconomic outcomes of the
last ten years. Monetary policy has been very restrictive from 1998 up to 2003 and
this has contributed to keep both the recession and the deﬂation going for a number
of additional years. The situation appears to have marginally changed since 2003 and
the upward trend that the unexpected output path displays in the last few years is
almost entirely due to monetary policy shocks. Thus, there is an important lesson to
be learned: a policy of sustained quantitatively easing may be the way to bring the
economy out of a recession at times when the nominal interest rate hits the zero bound.
6C o n c l u s i o n s
This paper examines whether money had a role in shaping monetary business cycles in
Japan. The theoretical framework of analysis is a small scale structural New Keynesian
model where the stock of money potentially enters the utility function and the monetary
policy rule. We estimate the parameters using a maximum likelihood technique. We
ﬁnd likelihood based techniques preferable to GMM and similar methods because they
take into account the whole system of equations in the estimation and provide a natural
framework to test restrictions on the speciﬁcation we employ. We refrain from using
a-priori restrictions on the parameter space to make the information content of the
data as transparent as possible.
We study four questions. First, does money have a role in explaining ﬂuctuations in
output and inﬂation in Japan since 1980? Second, is there a change in the importance
of money over interesting subsamples? Third, does the model accounts for the Lost
Decade via changes in the economic parameters or via changes in the distribution of
the shocks? Fourth, what disturbances could be jointly responsible for the output
stagnation and the deﬂation observed in the 1990s?
We ﬁnd that money is statistically and economically important in characterizing
cyclical ﬂuctuations in output and inﬂation in Japan. Money matters both directly,
through its eﬀects on the Euler equation and the Phillips curve, and indirectly, through
the Central Bank determination of the nominal interest rate. Money plays a role in the
model because it alters both the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and
22leisure and the intertemporal rate of substitution of consumption at diﬀerent points in
time and because, when reacting to nominal balances, the monetary authority indirectly
reacts to inﬂation. These three channels help to amplify the magnitude of cyclical
ﬂuctuations that the model can account for and stretch their persistence over time.
Our evidence suggests that neglecting money may create important statistical biases
and relevant inferential mistakes in interpreting sources and transmission of cyclical
ﬂuctuations, in general, and the 1990s in Japan, in particular.
We detect changes in the role of money over time and our estimates indicate that
money may have mattered most in the 1990s. While this outcome may be taken as a
sign of misspeciﬁcation, we have found no evidence that money stands in for standard
omitted suspects such as asset prices, oil, etc.. Thus, it appears that the quantity of
money in circulation may have contributed to transform the downturn of the beginning
of the 1990s into a severe output stagnation and a moderate inﬂation into a deﬂation.
Our model accounts for Japan’s Lost Decade through changes in the economic pa-
rameters regulating the private sector behavior and the monetary policy rule and in
the auxiliary parameters regulating the persistence and the volatility of the exogenous
disturbances. However, changes in the distribution of the shocks are a much more
important mechanism to account for the experience than changes in economic parame-
ters. This is consistent with what the literature on the Great Moderation in the US
has found using similar small scale structural models (see e.g. Canova, 2009).
Finally, the prolonged fall in output and the persistent deﬂation experienced in
Japan in the 1990s appear to be due to diﬀerent causes. Shocks that aﬀect the in-
tertemporal marginal rate of substitution in the economy are crucial to explain the
path of output. Shocks that alter the marginal cost of production, on the other hand,
primarily drive inﬂation movements. Interestingly, technology shocks have little to do
with the long output stagnation of the 1990s. Since it is well known that Solow residuals
are poor proxies for technological variations, the idea that TFP changes are responsible
for Japan’s lost decade should be probably reconsidered. Finally, monetary policy is to
blamed for the poor macroeconomic outcomes, at least since 1998. Monetary policy has
been very restrictive up to 2003, and this has contributed to keep both the recession
and the deﬂation going for a number of additional years. The situation appears to have
changed since 2003, but only marginally.
While we consider our investigation successful, and think that the lessons it provides
are useful and appealing to students of the Lost Decade, three caveats needs to be
23mentioned. First, the model used to interpret the data is highly stylized and it is
possible that money proxies for other important omitted inﬂuences. We have checked
if some standard suspects could matter and found no evidence in favor of it. However,
general conclusions cannot be drawn unless a larger and less stylized model is used to
analyze the experience. Future work in the area should consider this a priority. Second,
while the role of money seemed to have changed over time, estimates over subsamples
are not statistically signiﬁcant because the size of samples is limited and the amount of
noise present in the data large. Ideally, one would like to go back to the beginning of
the 1970s to properly estimate the model over subsamples. Data limitations, however,
p r e v e n tu st od om o r ei nt h a td i r e c t i o n . T h i r d ,w h i l ew eh a v es t r e s s e dt h a tc e r t a i n
conclusions crucially depend on giving money a proper role in the economy, others are
not inﬂuenced by this feature. Disentangling which aspects of the model economy could
be aﬀected more by the presence of money, should also be a priority for those interested
in measuring the contribution of money to medium term business cycle ﬂuctuations.
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25Using M2 Using M1
1980-2007 1980-1991 1980-1997 1992-2007 1998-2007 1992-2007 1998-2007
ψ 0.035 (0.007) 0.199 (0.345) 0.005 (0.003)0.099(0.230) 0.049 (0.171) 0.303 (0.098)12.785(0.875)
ω2 1.740 (0.499) 0.266 (1.927) 2.164 (0.952)0.489(3.473)- 0.043(2.268)-0.372(0.136) -0.396 (0.057)
γ2 0.696 (0.249) 1.512 (3.140) 0.567 (0.312)0.508(3.071) 1.948 (3.601) 6.006 (0.634) 7.859 (1.287)
h 0.990 (0.003) 0.884 (0.069) 0.989 (0.003)0.979(0.061) 0.878 (0.442) 0.986 (0.003) 0.639 (0.166)
ρr 0.819 (0.020) 0.668 (0.530) 0.835 (0.043)0.869(0.200) 0.972 (0.095) 0.980 (0.005) 0.950 (0.011)
ρy 0.094 (0.075) 0.753 (1.974) 0.036 (0.036)0.123(1.826) 0.511 (3.116) 0.356 (0.356) -0.192 (0.166)
ρp - 0.112(0.702)- 0.920(1.849)- 0.535(0.860)0.001(4.702) 0.434 (4.569) 1.464 (0.509) 2.028 (0.570)
ρm 1.508 (0.642) 2.181 (3.570) 1.762 (0.960)1.006(2.484) 0.962 (3.345)-0.160(0.203) -0.006 (0.133)
ρa 0.252 (0.113) 0.750 (0.167) 0.179 (0.273)0.323(1.982) 0.648 (0.834) 0.345 (0.140) 0.882 (0.017)
ρe 0.994 (0.002) 0.934 (0.075) 0.963 (0.026)0.897(0.321) 0.901 (0.365) 0.918 (0.021) 0.903 (0.021)
ρz 0.640 (0.075) 0.907 (1.180) 0.975 (0.010)0.048(1.374) 0.020 (1.830) 0.159 (0.190) 0.759 (0.068)
σr 0.005 (0.113) 0.009 (1.082) 0.007 (0.102)0.003(1.805) 0.001 (1.636) 0.001 (0.169) 0.001 (0.252)
σa 0.420 (0.288) 0.080 (1.275) 0.427 (0.596)0.179(3.213) 0.034 (2.468) 0.217 (0.237) 0.009 (0.286)
σe 0.008 (0.100) 0.015 (1.496) 0.009 (0.129)0.005(1.154) 0.006 (1.540) 0.025 (0.142) 0.025 (0.119)
σz 0.220 (0.324) 0.100 (2.029) 0.150 (0.119)0.151(3.230) 0.285 (4.156) 0.045 (0.461) 0.002 (0.152)
Table 1: Estimated coeﬃcients and standard errors, various samples.
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Figure 2: The data
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Figure 6: Counterfactual paths, estimates up to 1991:4
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Figure 7: Counterfactual paths, estimates up to 1997:4
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